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is it ever to be expected that the particular restricted area will comprise a very
large proportion of a city's total area. Nonetheless, the suggested approach is
still relevant since the cases most often arise in cities having a substantial Negro
population and in which all the restricted areas together constitute a specified
large proportion of the total.47 It seems that when a court considers only the
particular covenant in issue it is disregarding the fact that enforcement of one
covenant means enforcement of all like covenants, and as an agency of the
state48 it is actually enforcing a discriminatory situation by judicial decision
which Buchanan v. Warley bars the states from creating by legislation. Moreover, the value of this approach need not necessarily depend upon a specified
percentage of a city's area being restricted, for the same racial zoning result is
achieved where only that part of a city's area which immediately surrounds the
"black belt" or protects the more desirable residential districts of the city is
restricted.
The cases indicate that, on the whole, the new attacks on restrictive covenants so far have been met by a firm adherence to precedents originating in the
older types of attack. Although there is no showing of social data in the record in
either of the cases in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, if the
Court should consider the data and arguments in the amicus briefs in Sipes v.
McGhee or grant certiorari, in Hurd v. Hodge, it will have before it a complete
presentation of the attacks on restrictive covenants. The weight of precedent in
the state courts and the improbability of direct legislation outlawing covenants
make it evident that the Supreme Court in granting certiorari affords, perhaps,
the major hope of ameliorating one of the most critical areas of racial tension in
contemporary American life.49

RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT DISTINCTION
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt, always troublesome,
played an important part in United States v. United Mine Workers," where the
Supreme Court approved the procedure used by the District Court in imposing
a fine combining both civil and criminal elements in a single contempt proceeding. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his dissent in the Mine Workers case2 and again in
47 For example: "The exact extent of the restrictive covenant has not been ascertained, but
'in Chicago it has been estimated that 8o% of the city is covered by such agreements .....
Myrdal, op. cit. supra note 35, at 624.
.48Authorities cited note 31 supra.
49What the Supreme Court will decide is conjectural, but if it should decide only that injunctions in such cases are unconstitutional, without determi ing that restrictive covenants are
themselves void, the question of damages might become prominent. It is the remedy of enforcement by injunction, however, that effectively and necessarily prevents Negroes from acquiring restricted property.

1 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947)-

2 67 S. Ct. 677, 7u
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Penfield Co. v. Secuitlies & Exchange Commission,3 has vigorously attacked such
procedure. He contends that it violates the Constitution, clear judicial precedents, and the rules of criminal procedure.4 Under the Taft-Hartley Act,S injunctions may become an important incident of the government's regulatory
activities in the field of labor relations; it is therefore regrettable that there
should be confusion and doubt as to the procedural aspects of injunction enforcement.
The difficulties that have plagued both courts and writers6 in their analysis of
the contempt power are perhaps caused by the breadth of the term "contempt,"
which includes, among others, such widely divergent elements as the power of a
court of equity to compel obedience to its in personam decrees and the power of
any court to punish those who misconduct themselves in the courtroom. The
contempt power is sometimes analyzed on the basis of the character of the contemptuous act;7 it is said, in general, that a contempt is criminal when it involves a wilful and obstructive defiance of a court's authority, but that a contempt is civil if its primary effect is to injure the opposing party in the litigation.8 This analysis breaks down, however, when applied to the violation of an
injunction, where the contemptuous act is both a defiance of the court and an
injury to the opposing party. 9 In the injunction situation, the criminal-civil
distinction comes into play only after action is taken against the party in contempt. The proper analysis rests on the nature of the sanctions invoked rather
than on the character of the contemptuous act.' ° When punitive measures are
sought, in the form of fixed fines or terms of imprisonment, the contempt is con3 67 S. Ct. 918,
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(I947).

support of the Rutledge position see Watt, The Divine Right of Government by
Judiciary, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 409, 449-51 (i947).
s Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o. The act permits, and in certain situations directs, the Labor Board to apply to the courts for injunctive relief.
4In

6 See Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161 (19o8). The
distinction between civil and criminal contempt and its application by the courts in injunction
cases is exhaustively discussed in Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43
Col. L. Rev. 780 (i943). Further inquiry is needed only in the light of the problem of mixed
proceedings raised by the Mine Workers case.
7 Thomas, Problems of Contempt of Court 2 (x934); Rapalje, Contempt § 21 (1884).
8The distinction is sometimes made between refusing to do an act commanded (civil), and
doing an act that has been forbidden (criminal). Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418,443 (igini). Contempts may be considered criminalwhen they are especially wilful or
"contumacious," or when the act involved is also an indictable crime. Moskovitz, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 793 ff.; see In re Eskay, 122 F. 2d 8ig (C.C.A. 3d, 1941); In re Fox, 96 F. 2d 23
(C.C.A. 3 d, 1938).
9Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 221 (1932); Bessette v. W. B. ConkeyCo.,;194U.S.324,
329 (X9o4).

10"It is the purpose of the punishment,rather than the character of the actpunished,which
determines whether the proceeding is for civil or criminal contempt." Lamb v. Cramer, 285
U.S. 217, 220 (1932); see Gompers v. Bucks Stove &Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,443 (igii); In re
Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 458 (C.C.A. 8th, 19o2).
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sidertd-crminal; if, however, the sanctions are to be coercive and remedial, in
the form of fihes or imprisonment contingent on continued disobedience, or of
fines payable as compensation to the complainant, the contempt is civil." The
distinction is important since it will control the procedure by which the party in
contempt is tried. If civil remedies are involved the contemnor is considered to
have the power to avoid the penalties by compliance with the court's decree,12
and he is therefore given no protections beyond those afforded to any party in a
suit in equity;'3 the defendant in a case of criminal contempt, on the other
hand, is surrounded by almost all of the safeguards of an accused in a regular
criminal action, except for the right to a trial by jury.14 It is the contention of
Mr. Justice Rutledge that these important procedural differences are threatened
with extinction if a court may impose bath civil and criminal sanctions in a
single contempt proceeding.
Mr. justice Rutledge, in his'dissent in the Mine Workers case, first attacked
the use of a single mixed proceeding on broad constitutional grounds, pointing
out that under our system civil and criminal procedures are sharply differentiated and never mixed, and that, in fact, the differences "mark one of the great
constitutional divides." s The problem is whether that general principle need be
applied to contempt proceedings, which are admittedly unique. The contempt.
procedure must be judged, not in the light of broad generalities, but in terms of
specific rights protected or abused. 6
- The distinction is perfectly workable even though civil (remedial) relief may have
incidental criminal (punitive) effects, and vice versa. Moskovitz, op. cit. supra note 6, at 786.
32The Anglo-American system is unique in its assumption that the coercive power of the
courts is absolute and that no one is privileged to disobey the lawful order of a court. Pekelis,
Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies: A Comparative Study, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 665, 66776 (1943). Moreover, the contemnor's intent is not material. Telling v. Bellows-Claude Neon
Co., 77 F. 2d 584 (C.C.A. 6th, 1935); Proudfit Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder
Co., 23o Fed. 120, I32 (C.C.A. 6th, 1915); Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard
Co., 75 Fed. 972 (C.C. Ind., z896).
'3 There is no presumption of the defendant's innocence; the proof of the violation need
only be "clear and convincing." Telling v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 77 F. 2d 584 (C.C.A. 6th,
1935); Coca-Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 364 (Tex., i934).
'4 The defendant is given the presumption of innocence. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (ig1); United States v. Balaban, 26 F. Supp. 491 (Ill., 1939).
Proof of the violation must be beyond a reasonable doubt. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U..S. 48, 444 (i9II); Sabin v. Fogarty, 7o Fed. 482 (C.C. Wash., x895). The defendant enjoys the privilege against self-incrimination. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 48, 444 (Ig1); Hammond Lumber Co. v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 167 Fed.
8og (C. C. Cal., igog); United States v. Balaban, 26 F. Supp. 491 (Ill., 1939). There can be
no review of an order dismissing criminal contempt charges. United States ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Bittner, it F. 2d 93 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1926). One convicted of criminal
contempt may be pardoned. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). But in the absence of
statutory authority a criminal contempt defendant is not entitled to trial by jury. Michaelson
v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924); Donato v. United States, 48 F. 2d I42 (C.C.A. 3d, 1931);
Armstrong v. United States, i8 F. 2d 371 (C.C.A. 7th, 1927).
is United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 S. Ct. 677, 730 (1947).
X6 The courts often point out that contempt proceedings are'!sui generis" and that formulas
based on practices in other fields of the law may not be applicable, Blackmer v. United States,

NOTES
" Mr. Justice Rutledge's second contention was that the mixed proceeding in
the Mine Workers case violated the strong precedent of Gompersv. Bucks Stove &
Range Co.'7 It should be noticed that the Gompers decision did not involve a
single proceeding resulting in both civil and criminal penalties. Gompers, as
president of the American Federation of Labor and editor of the American
Federationist, was enjoined from continuing a boycott against the complainant's products; when the injunction was disobeyed, Gompers was cited for contempt and sentenced to a year in prison. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the ground that punitive measures may be imposed only in a proceeding
"instituted and tried asfor criminal contempt,"' 8 and that theproceeding against
Gompers had been primarily civil and not criminal. In the proceedings against
Gompers the contempt matter had been treated as part of the main equity cause,
the equity plaintiff had been the prosecuting party with the government taking
no part, and the defendant had been called as a witness against himself; these
and several other characteristics of the proceeding were consistent with an action for civil but not for criminal contempt. The Court pointed out that a
defendant in a criminal contempt action was guaranteed certain important protections, but that such safeguards would be of no help to him if he were not
given warning that the measures to be taken would be punitive rather than
remedial. The gist of the decision, therefore, clearly seems to be that a contempt
defendant must have notice of criminal charges against him before punitive
measures may be imposed.9
The federal courts have unanimously followed the Gompers case"° but, until
Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissent in the Mine Workers case, there was no suggestion that the Gompers decision had forbidden the imposition in a single proceeding of both civil and criminal penalties. The courts in each case have scrutinized
contempt proceedings which resulted in criminal penalties to see that there was
no "variance between the procedure adopted and the punishment imposed.""2
Following the method of the Gompers case, the courts look for a number of particularly indicative earmarks. If the contempt proceeding is entitled and treated
as a part of the main equity cause there may be a presumption that only remedi284 U.S. 421, 44o

(1932); Conley v. United States, 59 F. 2d 929, 935 (C.C.A. 8th, x932);
Armstrong v. United States, i8 F. 2d 37r, 372 (C.C.A. 7th, 1927); United States v. Balaban,
26 F. Supp. 49r, 498 (Ill., 1939). For a particularly unfortunate use of the phrase "sui generis"
in dealing with a question of specific rights, see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 67 S. Ct. 918, at 93o.

17 221 U.S. 418 (1911).

s Ibid., at 444.
" McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 8o F. 2d 211 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935); In re Guzzardi,
74 F. 2d 67, (C.C.A. 2d, 1935); Shulman v. United States, i8 F. 2d 579 (C.C.A. 6th, 1927);
Monroe Body Co. v. Herzog, z8 F. 2d 578 (C.C.A. 6th, 1927).
20 Citation of cases is unnecessary; almost every federal case involving the distinction between civil and criminal contempt uses the Gompers decision as its precedent.
2 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,.22I U.S. 418, 449 (IgII).
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al relief is contemplated." The wording of the prayer for relief is often taken to
indicate the nature of the action,23 although such words as "punishment" may
be considered equivocal and not conclusive.24 The parties, by their actions, may
reveal their understanding of the proceeding ;25 if the complainant, for instance,
27
6
requests the payment of costs to himself' or calls the contemnor as a witness,
he clearly cannot claim to have criminal penalties in mind. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in an effort to dispel the uncertainty arising from the use of
this general "earmark" test, has adopted the rule that the identity of the prosecuting party may be conclusive in that criminal penalties cannot be imposed
unless the contempt is prosecuted by a government attorney or by a private
28
attorney specially appointed by the court to vindicate its authority.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,29 in effect since March of 1946,
embody the Second Circuit Court's suggestion in Rule 42(b), which states, in
part: "A criminal contempt [excepting those that occur in open court] shall be
prosecuted on notice. The notice shall-state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the
essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as
such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence
of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an
order of arrest." Rule 4 2(b) was violated in the Mine Workers case, in that the
= Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 F. 2d gio (C.C.A. 7th, i93o); Wakefield v. Housel, 288 Fed. 712
(C.C.A.'8th, 1923); S.Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co., ii Fed. 208 (C.C.Cal., x9ii); The
Navemar, 17 F. Supp. 495 (N.Y., 1936). But see Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33,42 (I94i);
In re Kaplan Bros., 213 Fed. 753 (C.C.A. 3d, 1914), cert. den. sub nom. Kaplan v. Leech,
234 U.S. 765 (1914); Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron, Steel &Tin
Workers, 2o8 Fed. 335 (D.C. Ohio, 1913); United States v. Huff, 206 Fed. 700 (D.C. Ga.,
1913).
3 Western Fruit Growers v. Gotfried, 136 F. 2d 98 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943); Monroe Body Co.
v. Herzog, 18 F. 2d 578 (C.C.A. 6th, 1927); Shulman v. United States, i F. 2d 579 (C.C.A.
6th, 1927); In re Kaplan Bros., 213 Fed. 753 (C.C.A. 3d, 1914), cert. den. sub nom.
Kaplan v. Leech, 23 4 U.S. 765 (iqi4); In re Kahn, 204 Fed, 58i (C.C.A. 2d, 1913); Kreplik v.

Couch Patents Co., 19o Fed. 565,(C.C.A. ist, 1911); S. Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co., i91
Fed. 208 (C.C. Cal., i91i).
24In re Guzzardi, 74 F. 2d 671, 672 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935).
"Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., i9o Fed. 565, 570 (C.C.A. ist, i9ii). But see National
Popsicle Corp. v. Kroll, io4 F. 2d 259 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939), where the court refused to consider "equivocal remarks made by court or by counsel."
6Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 447 (i9i).
27Wakefield v. Housel, 288 Fed. 712 (C.C.A. 8th, 1923).
28National Popsicle Corp. v. Kroll, 104 F. 2d 259 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939); McCann v. New
York Stock Exchange, 8o F. 2d 211 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935), noted in 46 Yale L. J.326 (1936); In re
Guzzardi, 74 F. 2d 671 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935). Other courts have used the test but have not considered it conclusive. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42 (1941); Western Fruit Growers v.
Gotfried, 136 F. 2d 98 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943); Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 F. 2d 9IO (C.C.A. 7 th, i93o);
The Navemar, 17 F. Supp. 495 (N.Y., 1936); Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Amalgamated
Ass'n of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers, 2o8 Fed. 335 (D.C. Ohio, 1913).
2918 U.S.C.A. following § 687 (Supp., 1946).
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petition for a rule to show cause, while stating the "essential facts constituting
the criminal contempt," did not specifically describe it "as such."3o The Supreme Court decided, however, that the defendants had been given actual
notice of the criminal charges against them so that the violation of Rule 4 2(b)
was not reversible error. 31 Whether or not one agrees with the Court's ruling, it
was clearly within the Court's discretion under the "harmless error" provision
embodied in Rule 52(a)32 to decide that the basic rule had been followed and
that the formal discrepancy had caused no substantial harm..3
Assuming that there was adequate compliance with the requirements of
notice in the Mine Workers case, the problem remains as to the propriety of a
single proceeding in which civil and criminal contempt elements are mixed.
The lower federal courts, both before34 and since35 the Gompers decision, have
used such mixed procedure in a number of cases. The Supreme Court has never
passed on the question specifically, but a few cases involving the mixture have
been before the Court and have not met with disapproval.31 The same Court
that handed down the Gompers decision, in fact, a year later followed the rule
that when civil and criminal contempts are adjudicated in a single proceeding
the criminal element dominates and determines the procedure for review,7 a
3o United States v. United Mine Workers, Transcript of Record, at p. 66.

s" United States v. United Mine Workers, 6 7 S. Ct. 677, 697-700 (x947). The government's
petition for rule to show cause was strongly worded in terms of "punishment," and the defendants in their motion to discharge the rule and the arguments thereon indicated their
realization of the criminal charges. Transcript of Record, pp. 66, 82, 190-95. The government's theory of action was thoroughly discussed between the parties and the court before the
actual trial for the contempt was begun. Ibid., 195-201.
32 "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights sball
be disregarded." Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, z8 U.S.C.A. following § 687 (Supp.,
1946). See also Section 269 of the Judicial Code, 40 Stat. z8i (1919), 28 U.S.C.A. § 391 (1928).
33 The proper scope of the "harmless error" rule has been a troublesome question. See
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 512 (1942);
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155
F. 2d 631 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
34 Continental Gin Co. v. Murray Co., 162 Fed. 873 (C.C.A. 3d, i9o8); Christensen Engineering Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 135 Fed. 774 (C.C.A. 2d, i9o5); Chicago Directory Co. v. United States Directory Co., 123 Fed. 194 (C.C.N.Y., 19o3); Cary Mfg. Co. v.
Acme Flexible Clasp Co., io8 Fed. 873 (C.C.A. 2d, 9oi); Sabin v. Fogarty, 7o Fed. 482 (C. C.
Wash., 189S); Hendryx v. Fitzpatrick, i9 Fed. Sio (C.C. Mass., 1884).
3SUnion Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107 (1922); Wilson v. Byron Jackson Co., 93 F. d
577 (C.C.A. 9th, 1937), noted in 16 N.C.L. Rev. 389 (1938); Merchants' Stock & Grain Co. v.
Board of Trade, 2oi Fed. 20 (C.C.A. 8th, 1912); Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., x9o Fed. 565
(C.C.A. ist, 1911); see Woodside v. United States, 6o F. d 823 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1932); Proudfit
Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder Co., 23o Fed. 120 (C.C.A. 6th, 1915);
Morehouse v. Giant Powder Co., 206 Fed. 24 (C.C.A. 9th, 1913); Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate
Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers, 2o8 Fed. 335 (D.C. Ohio, 1913).
36 Farmers & Mechanics National Bank v. Wilkinson, 266 U.S. 5o3 (1925); Union Tool Co.
v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107 (1922); In re Merchants' Stock and Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639 (1912).

37In re Merchants' Stock and Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639 (1912). The rule was first adopted
in Matter of Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U.S. 458 (i9o4).
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rule that would seem to imply approval of ihe procedure which necessitated its
creation.
Mr. Justice Rutledge, in denouncing the mixed criminal and civil contempt
proceeding, speaks of the procedures used in the two kinds of contempt cases as
if they were alternative and confficting.38 But the contemnor's safeguards are
not alternative according to whether the charge is civil or criminal-he merely
has more of them if the contempt is criminal. A contemnor can hardly complain
if the charges of civil contempt against him are tried in a proceeding in which he
is afforded all the protections given a criminal defendant. It is difficult to deny
the government's contention in the Mine Workers case that the mixed proceeding was justified so long as the maximum criminal protections were afforded the
defendants. s 9 The vital protective principle is still that embodied in the notice
requirements of the Gompers rule; so long as that rule is complied with there
would seem to be no particular danger involved in a single proceeding to try
both a civil and a criminal contempt.
The District Court in the Mine Workers case imposed a single fine of
$3,5oo,ooo, which included in unspecified proportions both a criminal penalty
for the contempt and civil compensation to the government for losses caused by
the violation of the injunction. The Supreme Court reduced the fine to $7oo,ooo
and made it wholly punitive,4o but it is unfortunate that in so doing the Court
did not specifically condemn the form of the fine imposed by the District Court.
The federal courts have accepted the levying of fines for civil contempt payable
as compensation to the complaining party, 4' and the procedure has been adopted
in a federal statute.4 But the courts have always followed the accompanying
principle that the amount of such a compensatory fine must be based on clear
evidence of the complainant's losses, particularly of profits lost and the expenses of litigation.43 Since the civil contemnor is given no special procedural
protections, it is essential that a fine levied against him not exceed the opposing
's

United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 S. Ct. 677, 734-35 (1947).-

39 United States v. United Mine Workers, Transcript of Record, pp. 197-201.
40 United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 S. Ct. 677, 701-2 (1947). An equally important problem raised in the Mine Workers case concerns the propriety of a fine of $700,000 in
punishment for an act which, if prosecuted as a violation of the War Labor Disputes Act, 57
Stat. 165 (I943), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 15o6(b) (i944), would have drawn a maximum
statutory fine of $5,000. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge, United States v. United
Mine Workers, 67 S. Ct. 677, 740 (1947); Watt, op. cit. supra note 4, at 451.
41Leman v. Krentler-Amold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932); Raymor Ballroom Co.
v. Buck, 11o F. 2d 207 (C.C.A. ist, 1940); Feldman v. American Palestine Line, i8 F. 2d-749
(C.C.A. 2d, 1927); Morehouse v. Giant Powder Co., 206 Fed. 24 (C.C.A. 9th, 1913); Macauley
v. White Sewing Machine Co., 9 Fed. 698 (C.C.N.Y., i88i). See Civil Contempt and Indemnity to the Plaintiff, 26 Geo. L. J. 719 (1938).
4238 Stat. 738 (1914), 28 U.S.C.A. § 387 (1928).
43 Parker v. United States, 126 F. 2d 370 (C.C.A. Ist, 1942); Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 F. 2d
91o (C.C.A. 7th, 193o); Freeman v. Premier Mach. Co., 25 F. Supp.'927 (Mass., 1938); Coca-

Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 364 (Tex., 1934); Ready Roofing Co. v. Taylor, x5 Blatchf.
94 (D.C. N.Y., 1878).
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party's proven pecuniary losses, lest the fine become punitive.44 If in a mixed
criminal and civil proceeding a single fine combining both elements is imposed
the contemnor has no assurance that the compensatory part is not excessive.
In the usual case it would be a simple matter to split the fine into its component
parts; 45 and there would seem to be no reason to fear that the single mixed fine
will become habitual with courts which allow a mixed criminal and civil proceeding.
It is not meant to suggest in this note either a general approval or disapproval
of the Mine Workers decision or a minimizing of the need for a constant alertness
against abuses of the judicial contempt power. Attacks on the contempt power
which are based upon charges that the procedure employed is dangerous and
unconstitutional will succeed only where the procedure criticized is shown to
jeopardize specific rights and protections. It is arguable that the Supreme Court
in the Mine Workers case did not apply the Gompers notice requiremepts with
sufficient strictness; even with the Mine Workers decision on the books, however,
the Gompers precedent still stands,46 and it remains as the essential protection
which must be afforded parties charged with contempt of court.
44

McKee Glass Co. v. H. C. Fry Glass Co., 248 Fed.
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(C.C.A. 3d, 1918); Christensen

Engineering Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 135 Fed. 774 (C.C.A. 2d, i9o5).
4s Cases cited notes 34 and 35 supra.
46 In Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 67 S. Ct. 918 (1947), the defendant
was cited for contempt for failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to
produce icertain corporate books. The S.E.C. asked only for coercive relief but the District
Court refused to grant it, and instead imposed a small punitive fine and dismissed the defendant. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the fine and ordered the lower court to grant
the remedial relief requested by the Commission. The Supreme Court agreed, on the basis of
the Gompers rule, that a punitive fine should not have been imposed. Mr. Justice Rutledge
concurred, but he added that if the majority of the Court were to be consistent with the
Mine Workers decision it would have to let the fine stand. If the interpretation outlined in this
note is correct, the Mine Workers decision had no such effect on the Gompers precedent as
Mr. Justice Rutledge asserts.

